In May 2024, Polish judge Tomasz Szmydt, then employed at the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, fled to Belarus and sought political asylum. Just five days later, the Belarusian state news agency BelTA organized a press conference in Minsk where Szmydt praised the Belarusian authorities, criticized the West for moral and political decline, and described Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko as a “very wise leader.” This made Szmydt a valuable asset in Belarus’s information war against Poland, a role that continued in the following months. It is worth noting that Szmydt was neither the first Polish defector nor the catalyst for such Belarusian activities.
For several years, Belarus, along with Russia, has been conducting a hybrid warfare campaign. This activity significantly intensified in 2021 during the border crisis between Poland and Belarus when Belarusian authorities began coordinating the influx of migrants, pushing them towards the EU borders. This also meant an escalation of Minsk’s involvement in the information war, particularly through online means. Initially, these efforts focused on strengthening anti-Western and pro-Belarusian narratives through state-controlled media. However, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus expanded its efforts to create an online propaganda and disinformation infrastructure aimed against Poland.
In September 2023, Radio Belarus established a Polish-language presence on major online platforms, including Facebook, X, YouTube, and Telegram. These channels began publishing Polish-language content promoting Belarusian and Russian state propaganda, particularly focusing on war-related issues, often targeting Ukraine and its citizens residing in Poland. Over time, the channels also started producing original audio and video content, focusing on Polish socio-political issues and Polish-Belarusian relations. The content frequently featured Polish citizens presented as experts to lend credibility to the publications.
By February 2025, some of these channels had gained significant followings, with the YouTube channel amassing 16,000 subscribers, the TikTok channel 14,000 subscribers, and the X account reaching 1,000 followers. The YouTube channel offered various original programs discussing international relations and domestic political issues. Recent programs focused on the upcoming 2025 Polish presidential elections, with content alleging government censorship and electoral fraud.
One of the most active authors and contributors to Radio Belarus’s broadcasts and publications is Tomasz Szmydt, the Polish asylum seeker. Shortly after arriving in Belarus, Szmydt was integrated into the state’s propaganda apparatus. His initial activities included appearances on prominent Belarusian and Russian propaganda media outlets, such as an interview on the Russian state media program SolovyevLive. Subsequently, his efforts shifted towards influencing the Polish public, marked by increased activity on X and Telegram. Channels created to support Szmydt’s online presence continue to engage in discussions about Polish politics.
Belarusian information operations targeting Poland are gradually gaining popularity by creating more tailored and higher-quality content. This trend is accompanied by an increasing number of Polish citizens directly involved in Belarusian information activities. The escalating open information campaign around the 2025 Polish presidential elections underscores the importance of monitoring potential covert actions by Minsk that may target Poles on online platforms.